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ABSTRACT
Two of the puzzling macroeconomic phenomena of the 1970s have beenthe
persistent stagnation in Europe, and the disagreement between the U.S. and
Europe on the feasibility of recovery by demand expansion. Thispaper de-
velopes the hypothesis that the source of both the stagnation and thepolicy
differences is money—wage stickiness in the U.S. and real—wage stickiness
in Europe and Japan. A real wage which is sticky above itsequilibrium
level in Europe and Japan would account for stagnation andinfeasibility
of recovery by demand expansion. The theoretical modelsare developed
in boththe one-commodity andtwo-commodity-bundle cases. The empirical
resultsconfirmthat in the U.S. the nominal wage adjusts slowly toward
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I. Background and Introduction
Since 1974 the OECD area has seen several attempts at recovery from the
1974—75 recession, but the result has been stagnation. The recovery of
1975—77 in the United States took it uell ahead of the rest of the OECD
in the business cycle, even though the unemployment rate reached a low
of only 5.7 percent. The U.S. recovery led to a massive increase in its
current account deficit and the sharp depreciation of the dollar in 1978.
The "balance of payments constraint" on uncoordinated recovery reappeared
as an "exchange—rate constraint."
In November 1978 U.S. policy shifted sharply toward restraint and sup—
port for the dollar; the shift was announced publicly by President Carter.
Demand policy has remained tight ever since, especially with monetary poiicy
tightening in West Germany in 1979. The tightening of U.S. policy simply
recognizes that the U.S. cannot attempt recovery significantly faster than
Europe or Japan. The OECD countries appear to be locked into a system in
which economic growth is significantly limited by the growth rate of the
slowest major participant. The result of the shift in policy is renewed
recession and rising unemployment throughout the OECD area.
The constraining factor in the stagnation since 1974 seems to be the
difficulty of recovery, or reluctance to stimulate demand, in Europe and
Japan. The question we address is: why is recovery so hard in Europe
and Japan? During 1976—77 the OECD policy debate on recovery was mainly
the U.S. suggesting (more or less politely) that the countries in "strong"
current account positions, Japan and West Germany, take the lead, and those
governments either refusing or reluctantly proposing fairly timid measures.—2—
Essentially their position was that rapid demandexpansionwould lead only
to more inflation, with no significant gains in real output.
Onepopularexplanation for the policy difference between the U.S. and,
mainly, West Germany was that their sensitivity to or expectations of infla-
tion differed. Another could be that the implicit model behind the German
view was a textbook "classical" model with no money illusion and fully flex-
ible wages and prices, while the implicit U.S. model has sticky wages or
money illusion. This view of the German economy did not seem realistic.
A more satisfactory model of the European side was presented by Herbert
Giersch when he talked in Princeton on March 1, 1978. Our interpretation of
his view was that the German real wage was rigid, at least downward, above
its equilibrium value. This model would give the "classical" results that
demand expansion only raises prices with no effect on output, but not in a
flexible wage—and—price context. As we see in Section II below, an assump-
tion of real—wage rigidity of this sort in Europe and Japan plus nominal
wage stickiness in the U.S. would make sense of the 1976—77 policy debate.
As an initial check on the empirical plausibility of this model, we
perused the time—series data on real wage rates in major OECD countries. If
differences between real—wage and nominal—wage rigidities were a major fea-
ture of the OECD economies, they should appear in the 1974 recession, with
rigid real wages resisting the downturn more than sticky nominal wages.
This is especially true with the oil price increase.
The time—series data are sunarized in Table 1. Therewe see that the
only country with a protracted decline on realwages in the 1973—75 period
was the United States. There the real wage index peaked at 1.042 in1973:2,
and did not pass that level again until 1975:2. InGermany, real wage growth
continued straight through the recession until 1976. InItaly and Japan
there was a pause in 1974, with growth resumingby the beginning of 1975.
In the U.K. the real wage index continued togrow to mid—1976, with pauses
in 1974:2 and in mid—1975. These data provide some initialsupport for the— 2a—
Table 1
INDEX OF REALHOURLYCOMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES FOR SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES
YEAR GERNANY ITALY JkPAN U.K. U. S.
1971:1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1971:2 0.997 1.036 1.024 1.025 1.001
1971:3 1.029 1.058 1.053 1.012 1.003
1971:4 1.031 1.049 1.065 1.025 1.003
1972:1 1.057 1.057 1.116 1.037 1.016
1972:2 1.067 1.095 1.116 1.076 1.023
1972:3 1.076 1.111 1.124 1.069 1.027
1972:4 1.086 1.176 1.197 1.072 1.030
1973:1 1.119 1.177 1.142 1.064 1.042
1973:2 1.125 1.236 1.173 1.080 1.036
1973:3 1.139 1.259 1.222 1.088 1.034
1973:4 1.147 1.270 1.307 1.088 1.029
1974:1 1.161 1.255 1.169 1.121 1.018
1974:2 1.196 1.317 1.280 1.120 1.024
1974:3 1.228 1.277 1.305 1.164 1.024
1974:4 1.245 1.293 1.305 1.190 1.032
1975:1 1.262 1.356 1.340 1.204 1.041
1975:2 1.265 1.369 1.311 1.186 1.049
1975:3 1.276 1.414 1.307 1.191 1.047
1975:4 1.282 1.390 1.312 1.203 1.051
1976:1 1.277 1.391 1.312 1.208 1.057
1976:2 1.279 1.407 1.300 1.221 1.072
1976:3 1.294 1.434 1.300 1.217 1.075
1976:4 1.300 1.401 1.313 1.192 1.082'
1977:1 1.298 1.391 1.309 1.168 1.085
1977:2 1.318 1.418 1.314 1.150 1.086
1977:3 1.319 1.415 1.324 1.155 1.095
1977:4 1.348 1.423 1.339 1.174 1.103
1978:1 1.331 1.441 1.343 1.195 1.112
1978:2 1.364 1.421 1.345 1.227 1.106
1978:3 1.362 1.421 1.349 1.232 1.109
1978:4 1.385 1.432 1.362 1.248 1.109—3---
hypothesis, and were the basis for an informal discussion of it at the
International Seminar on Macroeconomics in 1978. This paper reports on our
continuing theoretical and empirical investigation of demand policy in a
series of models with differing types of wage rigidity across countries.
In Section II of the paper we develop a model of two countries with one
commodityand purchasing—power—parity (PPP). Here we obtain the clear—cut
Giersch results. Expansion in the country with rigid real wages raises the
world price level, increases output in the country with rigid nominalwages,
andalso reduces that country's trade deficit.
Theclarity of these results is blurred in Section III, where we study
a model with two commodities and do not assume PPP. This is the same general
framework used by Bruno and Sachs [1979] and Argy and Salop [1978]. Themain
differences are that the Section III model is analytic and focuses on effects
of demand policy, while Bruno—Sachs' several—country model is solved by
simulation and focuses on analysis of stagflation. Argy—Salop look only at
supply—side conditions, while we study demand and supply. As we see in
Table 3, the Bruno—SachsandArgy—Saiop results can be viewed as special
cases of ours.
The reason that the clear—cut Giersch results are lost in the two—
commodity case is that the relevant prices for workers' and producers'
decisions are different [as in Bruno—Sachs and Argy—Salop]. Producers look
at the price of domestic output; workers look at a cPI with imports in it
as well. Thus even if the real wage relative to the PI is rigid, if a
demand expansion at home pulls up the price of domestic output relative
to the CPI, employment and output expands. Only if exchange—rate adjust-
ment were immediate and complete, putting us back in the Section II PPP
world, would the difference not appear. The result is that, in Section
III, we see that the degree of "money illusion," or real wage vs. nominal
wage stickiness, is at least as important as actual wage rigidity for sort-
ing out the effects of demand policy.—4—
In Section IV we report some empirical tests of wage rigidity and money
illusion for five major OECD countries (U.S., U.K., Japan, Italy, Germany)
on time—series data since 1961. The sample is split at 1971 to see if pa-
rameters have changed in the l970s. An important thing to note about our
Table 4 regressions is that they report equations for gradual adjustment of
wage levels, with lagged wages and the level of demand as regressors. This
formulation follows from the theory of Sections II and III, where wage
rigidities are stated in terms of the relevant wage leveL Bruno—Sachs
[1979, p. 161 have the same basic theoretical structure but estimate Phillips—
type equations with the wage change depending on the level of demand.
The empirical results give us a classification as follows. The U.S.
stands out as the only country with short—run stickiness of nominal wage
rates. The U.K., Japan, Germany, and Italy all seem to have gradual adjust-
ment of real wages, consistent with effective indexation. In all five coun-
tries, response of the relevant wage to demand pressure is much less in the
1970s than over the entire period. These results are consistent with the.
Gierschhypothesis extended to the OECD.—5—
II. Wage Rigidities in the PPPModel
In this section we develop the simplest macro model with wage rigities
that yields interesting results for the effects of demand policy. The model
has two countries and one commodity (the "schmoo"), and assumes that the
t1aw of one price" holds, so that there is one world price, P, for the one
connnodity.' We hold the exchange rate constant at unity;alternatively we
could assume two different domestic prices for the commodity, P and *,
withthe exchange rate e defined by P =eP*.We begin with the specification
of aggregate supply conditions, then move on to demand in each country and
determination of the equilibrium price level. Next we study the effects of
demand policy and the consequences of different forms of wage rigidity.
Labor Market and Aggregate Supply
On the demand side of the labor market we have a production function
and a marginal productivity condition which yields the labor demand function
(1) y =y(N;K); >0;y <0; (production function)
>0;y <0.
(2) w =W/P= K). (demand wage)
In an equilibrium model, we would add a labor—supply function ww5(N),
and solve for equilibrium w and N. Here we assume that alternately either the
nominal wage or the real wage is rigid above its equilibrium value. We assume
that with the relevant wage rigid above its equilibrium level, employment is
determined along the labor demand function. This is the familiar minimum
condition in non—market—clearing models.-' Thus if the wage rigidity is
'See Table 2 for definition of variables.
-See Muellbauer and Portes [1979), forexample.—6—
Table 2: Definition of Variables
y —domesticoutput




g —exogenouscomponent of demand in real terms
a —realabsorption
x —realnet exports
*— superscriptfor the "foreign" country—7—
effective, labor is constrained in the amountofhours that employers will
buy. This is consistent with the specification of the demand side in the
nextsub—section.
In the case of the real wage rigidity we have w => equilibriumw,
and employment is determined along the labor demand function:
(3) v YN(N; K).
This gives us N as a function of v and the production technoJogy, and through (1)
it fixes y from the supply side. This is similar to the textbook tTclassical"
model (see Branson [1979]) and is illustrated in Figure 1.
With a nominal wage rigidity we have
(4) W= '
YN(N,K)
as the labor—market equilibrium (but non—clearing) condition. This is illus-
trated in Figure 2. The response of employment and aggregate supply to a
change in the price level is obtained from total differentiation of (4)
and the production function (1):
(5) 4J —> 0;dP 'N 3p >0.
w=w w=w
dK=O dK=0
Theresponse of aggregate supply to an increase in the capital stock s
given by











(a) labor market (b) Aggregate supply
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NAn increase in the capital stock shifts out the supply curve in Figures 1
and 2. Thus with the rigid nominal wage we can write the aggregate supply
function of FIgure 2(b) as
(7)y=y(P;K); P>°'K>°
with a rigid real wage y,0; with a rigid nominal wage y, >0.
In the two—country model we will assume that each country has an aggre-
gatesupply function of the form y =y(P, K). The "home" country will be
identified by unstarred variables; the "foreign"country bystars. Thus
the two aggregate supply functions are
(8a) y =y(P,K);
***
(8b) yy (P, K).
Remember that there isonly one world price level.
Inthe solution for equilibriumand comparative statics below we will
assumey, >0;y >0in general. Then when we analyze the effectsof differ-
ing wage rigidities on the results of demand policy we will assume the "home"
country has a real wage rigidity so that y =0,and the "foreign" country
has a nominal wage rigidity with y >0.The effects of changes in invest-
ment will come in only when we discuss policy to adjust to a real wage
* rigidity,so we omit the K argument In y and y until we reach that dis-
cuss ion.
Demandand Equilibrium P
With rigid wages above equilibrium in both countries, real absorption
will be a function of income, the price level, and a demand policy variable.
Income appears through a Keynesian effective—demand consumption function.
The price level represents a real balance effect with predetermined outside—10—
money.The demand policy variable can be thought of as the real deficit,
or real goverrunent purchases with given tax revenue. The income—expenditure
equilibrium conditions for the two countries are then
(9a) y(P) =a(y(P),P, g) + x;
** * *
(9b) y (P) =a(y (P), P, g ) —x.
Here net exports (the current account balance of the home country) x is
residually determined by income y less absorption a. With only one good
there are no terms—of—trade effects. This simplification will be re-
moved in Section III below. With two countries, x enters negatively in
(9b). The partial derivatives of a are signed a >0,a <0,ag >0(=1),
and similarly for a
The equilibrium world price level P is obtained by equating income
less absorption at home to absorption less income abroad:
(10) y —a=.(y* —a*).
Here we sum the excess demand functions in the two countries and find the
price level at which world excess demand is zero.
The next step is to derive expressions for the effects of changes in
*
demandpolicy g and g on the price level. The effects on outputs y and
*
ywill follow immediately from the supply functions. The effects on the
current account x can then be solved from (9a) or (9b). Total differenti-
ation of (1Q) and solution for dP yields






ag1. The effect of demandexpansionon the price level does not depend—11--
*
onwhere it originates. The parametersand are Keynesian—type
multipliers.
The effect of demand expansion on net exports can be solved from the
total differential of (9a):
(12) dx — dg+ dg*.
An exogenous increase in home demand reduces x; an increase in foreign de—
*
mandincreases x. If both g and g rise by the sameamount,the effect
* / *
onx depeflds on the net absorption coefficients p and 4>.Lf-45>4>, a
balanced expansion increases x since net absorption falls more at home than
abroad.
*
Theincrease in outputs y and y that follows from an increase in g or
* **
gare simply dy =ydPand dy =ydP.Thus if the supply curves have
positive slopes, both levels of output and employment are increased by a
demand expansion in either country.
The Role of Wage Rigidities
Wecan now use the one—commodity model to study the effects of differing
wage rigidities on response to changes in demand policy. To be specific, let
us assume that in the home country the real. wage is rigid above equilibrium,
—* __* whilein tne foreign country the nominal wage is rigid. Thus w =w;W =W
by assumption. What are the consequences for the effects of a demand ex—
pans ion?
First, with a real wage rigidity at home y, 0 and 4>inequation (11)
reduces to —a. When the price level rises, there is an effect on absorp-
tion in the real—wage country, but no effect on output. The reaction of the
world price level with this pattern of wage rigidities is given by
1 *
(13) dP —a(dg + dg ).
'V—12--
The source of the demand disturbances still does not matter, but the price
multiplier is increased from equation (11) by elimination of the y output
effect. The expression for dx in equation (12) is also changed by sub-
stitution of —a for 4,.Itis still the case that dx/dg0 and dx/dg >0,
but it is more likely that a balanced increase in g and g decreases x be-
cause of the zero supply response in the home country.
To swnmarize, an increase in g in the real—wage country (a) increases
P, and by more than inaworld with no real—wage rigidity, (b) increases
output only in the other country, and (c) reduces the trade surplus In the
real—wage country. Thus if Germany were the real—wage country and the U.S.
were the nominal wage country, a fiscal expansion in Germany would be in-
flationary and reduce the German trade balance, but all the output and
employment effects would appear in the U.S.
This model can be generalized easily to a world of several countries,
some with real wage rigidities, some with nominal wage rigidities. A de-
mand expansion originating anywhere in the system will raise the price for
all, but increase output and employment only where nominal prices are
rigid. The trade surplus (deficit) will be reduced (increased) in the area
where the demand expansion originated, and a balanced expansion of demand
will reduce the trade surplus of the real—wage countries.
Effect of Capital Stock Expansion
Expansion of the capital stock in one country will increase supply in
that country, drive down the world price level, and in general reduceout-
put in the other country. We can see this by putting (8a) and (8b) fory
*
andy into the equilibrium conditions (9a) and (9b), inserting these Into
(10) for the world price level, and totally differentiating withrespect to
P and K. The result is—13—
—YK(l_aY)<
dK *+4'
Ifthe home (unstarred) country increases its capital stock, its output rises
unambiguously. Theexpressionfor dy is
y (1—a )
d (1— "
Since Y(l—a) <4', dy/dK>0.
If the real wage in the home country is rigid above equilibrium, so that
y1,0, capital stock expansion can increase output to the point where the
wage rigidity is no longer binding on the side of the demand for labor. Thus
one policy to escape the wage rigidity is incentives for investment. This
was Giersch's conclusion for West Germany. However, by reducing the world
price level P, this policy would tend to reduce output abroad unless y, =0.—14—
III. Adjustment with Diffrent±ated Product Bundles
The clear—cut results of Section II were derived in a framework with
only one good and one world price level. The sharpness of these results
is reduced when we go to a world of differentiated product bundles with
different prices. In reality the industrial countries trade products
that can be roughly aggregated into bundles of exportables and import—
ables, with the possibility of terms—of—trade changes between them. To
capture the effects of movements in the terms of trade, we turn to a
model in which the two countries produce different goods. These can be
thought of as different fixed—weight product bundles with their associated
price indexes. Introduction of two goods, and two prices, changes funda-
mentally the characterization of both the supply and demand sides of the
model, and makes the signs of the effects of expansionary policy in either
country on both outputs depend on particular parameter values.
The Demand Side with Two Commodities
In this section we develop a fairly standard two—country Keynesian
model with two goods. The two goods are the home exportable y with a
* *
priceindex P, and the foreign exportable y with a price index P .In
this framework we again study the effects of differing wage rigidities,
i.e., aggregate supply specifications, on the effectiveness of demand
policy in influencing output.
On the demand side we have the usual absorption equation for an open
economy:
(14) y =a(y,P, g) + X(P/ep*).
The consumer price index entering absorption is a function of the home
and foreign prices:—15—
(15) P =e(Pp*); 0, 0*, >0;0+0* =1.
The restriction on the sum of 0 and *followsfrom specification of P
p p
* *
asa weighted average of P and P ,andthe initial normalization P =P=1.
Total differentiation of (14), holding the exchange rate constant at
e =1,yields:
(16) dy =1 [(a0 + x)dP + (a 0* _x)dP* + dg].
Here x <0is the derivative of x with respect to eP/P. From (16) we
p
can write the demand function for y:
(17) y =V(P,p* g); VP <0; V* >0; Vg >O•
The partial derivatives of V are the coefficients in equation (16) above.
V* >0assumes that the terms of trade effect outweighs the absorption
effect when the foreign price level P rises. If the home good share in
the consumption bundle is at least equal to the import share, 0 <0*,
then V >V*.Thiscondition is not necessary since x enters V
p p p p
while —x enters V .
p p
Aggregate Supply with Two Commodities
On the supply side we first develop expressions for labor market
supply, demand, and equilibrium, and then show how these are affected
by the existence of wage rigidities above equilibrium levels.
The production function is equation (1) of Section II, where output
is the exportable good. The usual demand function for labor is given in
equation (2) above: =
YN(N).As an alternative we also introduce the
possibility that producers have market power in both home and foreign
markets, and can effectively prevent entry in the short run. In this case,—16—
both the home and foreign prices would enter the demand function for labor:
(18) N (N),
with P defined by:
(19) P p*); p, ip*> 0; p+4,*= 1.
In the competitive case P =P,and =1.However, (19) provides
the price index for a discriminating monopolist producing at home and
selling in both markets.-' In the algebra that follows, the competitive
case can be obtained by setting =1and *=
Thelabor supply function makes the real wage demanded a function of
the level of employment, with the nominal wage deflated by the consumer




Equilibrium in the labor market equates the nominal supply wage from (20)
to the demand wage from (18):
(21) P •g(N)=P
Total differentiation of (21) plus the production function (1) gives us
* theexpression for changes in y as functions of dP and dP on the supply
side:
(22) dy = [(iv — 0)dP + (p* — 0*)dp*].
NN p p p p
detailed analysis and proof, see Appendix A.-I I—
Herewe have set all prices at unity initially. It may help to note that
this implies also that initial w =g= =
From(22) we can write the general form of the supply function fory
as:
(23) y /i(P, p*); A >0; A* <0.
The signs of the partial derivatives of (23) are the coefficients of
(22), where we assume 0* >b*.This simply says the weight of foreign
prices in the worker's CPI is larger than it is in the firms' profits
function.
An interesting property of the A supply function should be noted here.
If workers focus on the real wage, correctly measured, in making the labor
supply decision, theti 0 ÷ 0* =1.Together with÷ 1,this
implies that A —A*; the supply function is syniietric wIth respect to
the two prices.
The Role of Wa Rigidities
We can now introduce wage rigidities on the supply side as specialcases
of (22) and (23). Consider first the case in which the realwage Is rigid
above equilibrium. We interpret this as an infinitely elasticsupply curve
for labor at the rigid wage w, so that thesupply function (20) becomes:
(20R) =w,
P
and In (22) =0.
This simply removes from (22) and (23), not changing the qualitative
slopes of (23). Thus going to a two—good model fundamentally changes the
"classical" effect of the real—wage rigidity. With the two price indexes
entering differentlyin producers' demand for labor and ifl workers' supply,—18—
a change of either price influences output supplied, with y/3P >0arid
*
2y/3P<0even with a real—wage rigidity. This will eliminate some of
the sharp results of the one—commodity model.
To impose a nominal wage rigidity, we re—write (20) as:
(20N)WW;
in addition to=0,i'nolonger enters the supply function. This
eliminates 0 and 0* from (22) and (23). In the usual case of L 1,
this takes us back to the supply function of Section II, equation (5),
with y/P =—l/y.
With complete wage rigidity, or complete "money illusion" in labor
supply, 0 and 0* =0,since the price level does not enter the labor supply
function as it affects the level of employment. With flexible nominalwages
and no money illusion, 0 ÷ 0* =1.In an intermediate case of partial
money illusion, the labor force would "perceive" a price index with 0±O* <1.
The perceived price index could be thought of as the actual CPI raised to a
power less than unity: P with<
Tosummarize, real wage rigidity would eliminateN from (22) and nominal
wage rigidity would further eliminate 0 and 0*. Both types of rigidity would
leave us with the supply function (23) with A >0.The sign of A*, the
cross—price effect on supply, is less clear. Normally A* <0.However, in
the case where ip 1,complete nominal wage rigidity would eliminate P from
the A supply function. If *issufficiently large compared to 0*, then
>0.
Demand and Supply in the "Foreign" Country
Equations (17) and (23) give demand and supply in the home country as
functions of the two price levels. At this level of generality, demand
-See Branson and Kievorick [1969] foruse of this parameterization
of money illusion.—19—
and supply in the foreign *countryare mirror images. The only point to
note especially is that the trade balance at home must equal the deficit
abroad. Thus the demand equation in the *countryis solved from:
*** -.** *
(24) y =a(y,P,g)—x(eP/P).
The foreign demand equation is then:
(25) y =V*(P,p*g*);V >0; V* <0; Vg* >0;
The supply equation is:
(26) y* =*(pp*); <0; A** >0.
The entire discussion for wage rigidities, etc., in the home case applies
in the tiforeignht case as well.
*
Giventhe values of the two demand policy variables g and g ,thetwo
demand functions (17) and (25), and the supply functions equations (23)
* *
and(26) give us four equations in the variables y, y ,P,P .These
already include the restriction that the trade balance x is the same for
both countries. Next we study the properties of this equilibrium by con—
sidering the effect of a demand increase dg in the home country.
Expansionary Demand Policy in One Country
We analyze the effect of expansionary demand policy in the homecountry
undera variety of institutional assumptions concerning wage rigidity. It
will be apparent that these have impacts on the results for the effectiveness
of fiscal poilcy. The model is summarized in equations (17), (23), (25) and
(26).
Totally differentiating these we obtain the following linear system:—20-








o 1-.V' V* dP* 0 pp. J
The determinant is given by:
** **
(28)A=(V _A)(V*_A*)_(V*_A*)(V —A). p p p p p p p p
Thisis the product of the own effects of price changes less the product of
the cross effects. The discussion after equation (17) led us to notIce that
the own demand effects are larger than the cross demand effects. Further—
more, in general, the own supply effects are larger than or equal to the
cross supply effects. Therefore, A can in general be taken to be positive.
The comparative status of the model of equation (27) following an in-
crease in g are summarized below:
d ** * *
(29) =V[A *(V—A)- A(V *- fl*)]/A.
dgg pppp p p
* * ** *
(30) ——= —V[A V *— VA *]/A.






Thenumerator of equation (29) for dy/dg is essentially Vg times the
own price effects less cross—price effects. Therefore in general we ex-
pect It to be positive. A major exception would be when home supply is
insensitive to prices; then dy/dg 0.Thenumerator of (30)contains—21—
only characteristics of the "foreign" country. When the foreign supply
*., functionis syetric with respect to the twoprices,the sign of dy lag
depends on the relative absolute values of the demand effects, and is
therefore negative." We return to a detailed analysis of (29) and (30)
below.
The condition that A >0is required to obtain the result that an
increase in g will increase both P and P in (31) and (32). If A <0,
* *
anincrease in g will decrease P and P .TheP, P solution for an in-
crease in g is illustrated in Figure 3. There, the PP line is the corn—
* binationof P and P that yields equilibrium in the home market. The
equation for this line is:
*
(V_A)dP=_(V*A*)dPVdg. p p p p g
For a given g, the slope is _(V —A)/(V*
—
AD*).The PP line is the
combination of P and P that yields equilibrium in the foreign country.
** ** *****
Theequation for P P is (V — A)dP =--(V*— A*)dp .IfP P is flatter
p p p p
than PP then Li is positive and an increase in g raises both prices along
** **
PP as in Figure 3. If P P were steeper than PP then an increase in g
would lower both prices.
Effects on Real Output
* Inanalyzing the comparative statics effects on y andyof a change
ing,we will study the cases in which the "home" country has no money
illusion, so that 0 + 0* =1.Whether the real wage is rigid will effect
only the size of the multipliers, with <0.For the "foreign" country
we will vary the assumptions across several of the differing cases of wage
rigidity distinguished earlier. These are:
is the result obtained by ArgyandSalop [1978).FIGURE 3:
—I
—22--







1. Rigid nominal wages, 'with C0* =0,and ij*1,
2. Rigid real wages, with 0* <
3.Rigid real wages, with0* >
4.Sticky nominal wages, with 0 + 0* <1.
Clearly this is only a small subset of the possible combinations of assump-
tions for wage behavior in both countries, as is obvious in equations (29)
and (30).
The four cases are summarized in Table 3. In the first case, even
with no money illusion at home, demand expansion increases home output
*
through the differentia]. effects of P arid P on noine supply. In Section II
with one commodity and corresponding prices dy/dg0. This may be the
proper case to associate with Giersch.
An important thing to note about cases 2 and 3 is that our results are
completely classical when, in any country, workers and firms are equally
sensitive to the home price level: 0* =ip*. Inthis case expansionary
policy in either country will not affect supply in that country.
If the foreign country (i.e., the one that does not expand) has a
fixed real wage while workers are more sensitive to the cross price than
are firms (case 2), the expansion at home is contractionary abroad. This
result -is the one obtained by Argy and Salop, Sachs, and Bruno and Sachs.
However, there are two caveats to this result. These are shown in cases
3 and 4. Enough money illusion in the foreign country will make the increase
in g expansionary there, as in case 4. By "enough" we mean that
* t * * *— 0*)(v + V *)
(33)0 +0*<l T T *
a- v*
pThBLE 3:Effects-oftem.nd r; Outur:
-1
ASStNPTIONSON WAGE BEHAVIOR EYFECT-S ON OUTPUTS
Home Foreign dy/dg dy*/dg
No money(1)Rigid nominal
illusion wage
(6 <ij,) 0*=0*=0;(*=i) + (Giersch case) +
same (2)Rigidrealwage
< ÷ (Argy—Salopcase)
O *p * 4- (classIcal case) 0
p p
same (3)Rigid real wage
-
> * +- (HongKong) +
same (4)Sticky money wage
+ 0* <1 + (Keynesian case) (+)25—
Ingeneral the EELS of (33) will be close to unity since (a)+
is small relative to and (b) (C*— O'*)is between minus one and
one. Therefore it takes but a little money illusion to reverse the con—
tractionary effect abroad of an increase in g at home. A final caveat is
that if in the foreign country firms are more sensitive to the cross price
than are workers, a rare case of which Hoag Kong may be an example, then
our increase in g is expansionary abroad.—26—
IV. Empirical Results on Money Illusion and Wagegi4i
To test for the existence of money illusion or wage rigidity webegin
by specifying a labor supply equation making the level of the nominal wage
dependent on the expected price level and a measure of labor demand. A
time trend is added to account for productivity growth and trends in the
variables. An estimating form of this static model would be
(34) Ln W a0a1 a2 ifl Dt + a3t +c.
Here e represents the expected price level, D is a measure of labor demand,
proxied below by real GNP, and the time trend is included to detrend W, F,
and D.
If the coefficient a1 were unity, money illusion would be absent and the
real—wage cases of Sections II and III with 0 + 0 * =1are relevant. If
p p
in addition a2 is insignificant, the real wage would be rigid in the rele—
vant period and =0in Sections II and III. If a1 were less than unity,
money illusion exists (0 + 0* <1),and the extreme case would have a1
Estimation of (34) directly would assume that wages adjust within a
quarter to changes on their determinants. The literature on wage equations
shows clearly that this is not the case. We have estimated equations in the
form of (34), and observed generally quite significant serial correlation in
the residuals. These equations using instrumental variables for and D,
as described in detail below, and the Cochrane—Orcutt adjustment for serial
correlation, are shown in Appendix B. The first—order serial correlation
coefficients p are generally in the .7 to .9 range, and the U.K. shows evi-
dence of higher—order correlation. This can be taken as evidence that there
isalagged adjustment process moving wage rates, adjusting the average wage
toward the statIc supply of labor schedule, whatever its slope. This fric-
tion could be due to the existence of long—term (more than one quarter)—27—
contracts, in nominal or real terms.
In a dynamic context we wish to test whether the adjustment process is
in terms of real or nominal wages, and how sensitive it is to demand con-
ditions. Thus the question is whether it is today's real wage that depends
on past real wages and curcent labor market conditions or today's nominal
wage that depends on past nominal wages and current labor market conditions.
The former adjustment mechanism (which results for instance from indexed
contracts) implies that our model is neutral to fiscal policy in the absence
of terms of trade effects. The latter corresponds to the presence of "money
illusion."
Let us reinterpret the static supply of labor function in equation (31t)
*
as giving the target wage W
* e
(35) 2,n W =t + lth Dt + +
We consider only models of the partial adjustment type. Nominal wage sticki-
ness is given by:
(36) in(Wt/Wti) =X(inW/Wi).
Real wage stickiness is given by:
(37) in (W/P)
—in(Wi/Pi) p .[in(W/P) —in(Wi/Pi) 1.
Thesetwoequations lead to two different short—run supply of labor schedules.
Using (35) and (36) we obtain for the nominal rase,
(38) in (We/P)(A—i) in(Pe/W + Ac1 in Dt + Aa2t + Xc.
Using (35)and(37)weobtain for the real—wagecase,
(39) in (W/P)=(l—i)in(Wi/Pi)+
pa3 in Dt+pci9t+—28—
These two models are nonnested. We can embed both hypotheses in a more




Here if =0,we have equation (36) representing nominal wage adjustment;
=1— wehave equation (37) instead. Substituting (36) for W
into (40) we obtain the estimating equation:
(41) 2,n(WIPe)= 2.n (P/W1) + 2,n (W1/Pti)
+y1a1nDt+ y1a2t+ 1i6t
This is the common alternative hypothesis against which we test (38) and
(39). We can compare the three equations directly. If 2 =0,l in (41)
is equal to X in (38); if 12 =1_li,then 2 is also equal to (l—p) in
equation (39).
We reject the hypothesis that it is the real wage that adjusts according
to equation (37) if the coefficient on 2,n(P /W1)
is significantly differ-
ent from zero. On the other hand we reject equation (36) if the estimate of
in (41) is significantly different from zero.- Of- course the models are
indistinguishable when the adjustment is instantaneous, i.e., =1,2
The estimating equation (41) is derived from specification of an equation
for the level of the nominal wage, (34) or (35), dependent on the level of
demand, and a standard adjustment mechanism. This is a different procedure
from that followed by Bruno and Sachs [l979]", Gordon [1977], and Spitaeller
-'Bruno and Sachs' 1979 specification involves a partial adjustment of
the rate of cha of wages to the equilibrium rate of change of wages which
depends on GNP. This leads to an equation similar to (41). We are working
on a paper that tests their specification directly against our "real" and
"nominal" wage adjustment models.—29--
[1976]. In particular, their specification assumes that the level of demand
affects the rate of change of wages, while a simple differencing of equation
(41) would put the change in demand into the equation for the change in the
wage rate. This difference must be kept in mind in interpreting our results
below.
In estimating equation (41) for five major OECD countries, we used price
data from the OECD Main Economic Indicators and CNP data from the International
Financial Statistics published by the IMP. The Dt variable is real GNP for
all countries except Italy where it is real GDP. The dependent variable is
hourly compensation, provided by the INF.-' The price variable is the
Consumer Price Index. All variables were seasonally adjusted using the
X—ll method.
We estimated all equations using instrumental variable estimates for
and GNP. For each country regressions were performed of the CPI and GNP
on four lagged values of CPI and GNP plus the current and four lagged values
of the money stock. Fitted values from these regressions were used in the
wage equation for and GNP. These are denoted as P and GNP in Table 4
below. This procedure can be interpreted econometrically as eliminating
the simultaneity bias running from the real wage to GNP and the CPI, or as
imposition of rational expectations on the wage equation.
- Weestimated equation (41) with quarterly observations for two periods,
one running from 1961 to 1978, the other from 1971 to 1978. This was done.
because the latter period exhibits a higher rate of inflation and it is
likely that workers are more sensitive to the price level when its increases
are larger. Furthermore, the period 1971—1978 saw a large increase in oil
also estimated the equations using hourly earnings and the hourly
wage as dependent variables. The results are virtually identical to those
using compensation data and are available upon request.—30—
prices which should have led to a reduction in the equilibrium real wage,
therefore making this an ideal period to test the rigidity of the real
wage. Equations in Phillips curve form have been estimated for the period
1958—73 quarterly by Gordon, for the period 1957—72 semiannually by
Spitaeller, and for the period 1962—76 annually by Bruno and Sachs.
The estimates of equation (41) are shown in Table 4. In all cases the
dependent variable is W/P. There are two equations for each country, one
for the full period 1961—78, and one for the shorter period 1971—78. The
coefficients are presented with their standard errors in parentheses. In
the last column of the table we give the result of the test of real versus
nominal wage adjustment. R means that the real wage hypothesis is accepted
and the nominal hypothesis is rejected, and vice versa for N. The R, N
entries signify that neither hypothesis can be rejected.
The first thing we notice in Table 4 is that. .the coefficient of the de-
mand variable GNP is significantly positive in all countries for the full
period, but insignificant for 1971—78. This says that in each of these
countries wage movements became less sensitive to demand variation in the
1970s than earlier; in terms of our theoretical model 8N =0.
Turning to the real vs. nominal wage issue, we see that the U.S. is the
only country where the nominal adjustment model dominates. The coefficient
of W1/P1 is effectively zero for both periods, and the estimate of the
A adjustment coefficient in the money wage model is approximately 0.7. This
result is consistent with the earlier findings of Bruno—Sachs [1979], Gordon
[1977] and Spitaeller [1976]. The U.K. regressions yield ambiguous results.
The nominal wage model is rejected over the full period, but neither hypothesis
can be rejected in the 1971—78 period. On the presumption that the real wage
model is accepted, the estimate of the p adjustment coefficient is approxi-
mately 0.45 over both periods. This fits the results of Bruno—Sachs, but—31—
Table 4: Tests of Real vs. Nominal Adjustment of Wages Using Hourly Compensation Data
(Dependent Variable n (W/P))
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
OUNTRYTIME PERIODP/W1—i'—1





































































































































For Japan and Italy, the nominal wage model is rejected for both periods.
The W1/P1 coefficient is insignificantly different from unity in all four
regressions, suggesting a long adjustment process with icloseto zero. These
results are roughly consistent with the literature.
For Germany, neither hypothesis can be rejected for the full period,
but the nominal wage model is rejected for 1971—78. As in Italy and Japan,
the p estimate is close to zero. These results are also roughly consistent
with the literature. Gordon and Spitaeller found money illusion in earlier
data sets ending in 1972 and 1973, respectively, and Bruno—Sachs reject it
on data through 1976.
In summary, it seems that sensitivity of wage movements to fluctuations
in demand has been reduced sharply in the 1970s relative to the earlier period
in all five countries. The U.S. is the only country in which the model of
nominal wage stickiness is supported; in the U.K., Japan, Italy and Germany
it is the real wage that adjusts slowly. This is consistent with effective
indexation in these countries as compared with the U.S.
In terms of the model in Sections II and III, only the U.S. seems to
have enough money illusion to bring about an expansion in response to third
country increases in demand. On the other hand, money illusion appears to
be absent in the U.K., Germany, Italy, and Japan. This means that these
countries may have to worry about the effect of expansionary fiscal policy
in the other countries.APPENDIX A
Consider a discriminating monopolist producing in the home country and
selling in two countries. He faces the following problem
*** * ax{p(q)q + p (q ,u)q—W•r(q+q )},
wherep(q) and p*(q*) are the inverse demand functions, r the employment
function with n'> 0,r' >0and u a shift parameter such that for a
*
higheru the foreigners are willing to pay more for each quant5ty q
* *
p>0.We assume further p *= 0.His first order conditions are: u uq
Pq
•q+ p W'
p*q -F p =Wrt'




Assuming p=p** = 0,weobtain: qqqq
2Pq — 2Pq (dq + dq*)
r
0
—Wr" 2p** (dq*) _p*du
*
whichleads todq dq>0 du
*
> 0. du
This means that an increase in demand in any one country leads to an in-
crease in demand for labor by the firm. We have written this as a demand—
for—labor function that. depends on both prices.APPENDIX B
Estimatesof Static Wage Equations
(Dependent Variable =2nW)
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
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